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Slippery Generics and the Key Schema 
 
Trevor Bloomfield 
 
Abstract 
 
In ‘Language and Race’, Luvell Anderson, Sally Haslanger, and Rae Langton highlight a slip of 
ambiguous expression exhibited by racial generics that harbor bad faith arguments, reduces social 
contingencies to racial essences, and masks oppression.1 They locate two psycholinguistic slips between 
classes of generics which communicate their use; one is between the characteristic generic and striking 
property generic and the other is between the characteristic generic and majority generic. I postulate three 
additional slips between classes of generics and speaker beliefs; one between the characteristic generic and 
the normative generic, another between normative generics and a speaker’s belief set, and another slip from 
a speaker’s belief set to a striking property generic. Together, the slips between generic classes constitute 
both a reception theory of the meaning of subject S’s utterance and the generic belief (re)generation process 
that structures the passage an assertion takes from a singular definite belief to a reinforcing normative 
generic inference in a minimal structure I name the key schema. 
 
Introduction 
 
Generics are generalizations that have a marked ability to admit exceptions. Generalizations contain 
inferences concerning their particular extensions. Generic terms have weak evidential demands and require 
few instances to establish associations regardless of their truth or falsity. These features make propositions 
expressed in generics difficult to cancel.2 The danger of generics is in their essentializing power over 
everyday speech norms.3 Social essentialism is the belief that a particular social kind exists independently, 
and that social kind are marked by shared stereotypical properties.4 Like slurs, generics are loaded with 
background beliefs concerning their meaning and use. Racial generics are a class of social kind generics that 
demand normative behavior in deference of a dominant racial narrative that reduces people to subordinate 
races or mere generic identities which are interchangeable with any other member of the group.5  I claim 
that this racial fungibility is a particularly damaging aspect of the confusive effects of generics.  
Slips are psycholinguistic shifts in meaning that are still in contact with their reference if and only if 
they accidentally refer to something else. That is, slips stand for something else that what they purport to 
ascertain but represent it anyways. For our purposes, slips occur between classes of generic predicated on 
the reception of their signifiers. One way of explaining the phenomenon is the ambiguous reference to an 
extension and the swift shift of attention from one potential target to the next. The easy passage between 
‘that’ and ‘thing’ when gesturing towards a generic object out of reach. (Ex. ‘I’m talking about that thing. No, 
that! No, that thing.’) Each utterance of ‘that’, ‘thing’, and ‘that thing’ refer to the same object in the world 
but the surface form of the communication does not specify what it is or how it is distinct from objects 
around it. However, the only description available to the receiver are the terms used to refer with the same 
form of ‘that thing’. It is left to the companion in retrieval to receive the salient object from view, which will 
at some level be found to be both ‘that thing’ and not ‘that thing’. Demonstratives are subject to their own 
issues6, in the previous illustration fail to refer but nonetheless reduce an entity to its reference as ‘that’, 
similar to how generic terms reduce a person to a fungible, tokenized generic identity.  
 
1 Anderson, L.; Haslanger, S. & Langton, R. (2012). 
2 Rosola, M., & Cella, F. (2020); Cimpian, A., Brandone, A. C., & Gelman, S. A. (2010). 
3 Cella, F. (2017), p. 143. 
4 Cella, F. (2017), p. 143. 
5 Kukla, R. (2018), p. 19. 
6 For a more in depth treatment of generic demonstratives, see Bowdle, B. F., & Ward, G. (1995). Generic 
demonstratives.  
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Sara-Jane Leslie divides generics into at least four classes which will be useful for our purposes: 
characteristic generics, majority generics, striking property generics, and normative generics7. I will 
paraphrase the relevant concepts as given by Anderson, Haslanger, and Langton (2012), although Leslie’s 
account is far more detailed. 
Characteristic generics such as “Ducks lay eggs” obtain because they assert a feature of the term in 
the subject position that is ostensive to that kind. That is to say, a feature that points to and indicates 
membership of a class of objects. 
Majority generics such as “Pants have pockets” obtain because they assert a statistical claim that 
many pants have pockets in virtue of the feature’s frequency among members of the kind actually indicated 
by the generic term.8 The propositions expressed in majority generics obtain even if there are instances of 
the kind that lack said feature, as long as there are no ‘positive’ counterexamples – instances of the kind 
with a feature that “overwrite” the majority generic feature.9 
Striking property generics such as “snakes are venomous” assert a feature that is harmful, 
dangerous, or salient enough to affect subjectivity. For Leslie, simply being a member of the kind predicates 
the ascription of the feature to the kind, however, it is neither a characteristic of the kind nor do its instances 
comprise a statistical majority.10  
Normative generics such as “boys don’t cry” assert ideal properties exemplary of the kind in the 
subject position. This class of generics involve specifying a kind’s primary performative function or social 
rule/role success conditions. Normative generics belong to a larger class of generics known as non-
descriptive generics so named due to their flexible predicate that operates like a rule structuring the moves 
of a game. Additionally, the ostensive members of a normative generic that lack the feature that is 
predicated by their group membership is sorted as ‘bad’, ‘defective’, or not functioning according to the role 
associated with the norm enforced by the generic. 
 
Characteristic, striking property, and normative generic claims share a surface form generalized to 
the proposition ‘G’s are fs.’ This one contingency preconfigures our generalizations and interface with 
categories which are already themselves contingent. In tandem with generic’s exemplary feature of 
exception-tolerance, I am of the mind of Rachel Sterken (2015) who makes the argument for genericity 
eliminativism and denies any content that is distinctly generic.11 There does not seem to be any clear and 
distinct generic outside bounded context. So, I will situate my investigations on what constitute slips of 
intentions to the reception of expressions as impressions of relative difference, or more succinctly, affects. 
The possibility of polysemic interpretation enabled by cognitive ‘shortcuts’ is a partial contributor to 
the durability and proliferation of generic claims. A shortcut is a compromise of rivaling demand of which a 
cognitive-affective analysis is a felicitous model. I suggest a closer examination of the path of least resistance 
a subject S may take to obscure their commitment to the policing of racial generics and the masking of 
oppression.  I have identified five entry points to the circuit of generic belief generation process by which 
pernicious beliefs are able to escalate their scope and inject their associated propositions into the common 
ground of discourse. By following the process and sublimations of each moment in racial discourse, we can 
name the problem that result from these slips. 
 
 
 
 
 
7 See Leslie, S.-J. (2015). 
8 I have been informed, much to the dismay of many, not enough pants have pockets. 
9 Leslie offers a psychological basis for the assignment of positive and negative status to features largely motivated by 
context. 
10 Leslie, S-J. (2008), p. 41. 
11 Sterken, R. K. (2015). Generics in context 
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Five Slips of Generic Reception 
 
I shall proceed to link the four generic classes and the notion of belief outlined above to their 
respective consequents. The key schema is composed of two parts; a parallel circuit between characteristic 
and majority classes of generics and a series circuit consisting of the notion of belief, striking property, 
characteristic, and normative classes of generics. 
The majority-characteristic slip lends a veneer of metaphysical and mathematical credence to 
generics that arise from the confusion of the expressions. The mentioned ‘confusive’ effects is aptly literal; it 
is the collision and fusion of two senses that derive from the same form, ‘Gs are fs.’ The following example 
MÛC adapted from Langton, Haslanger, and Anderson (2012) describes a common situation of a speaker 
S who utters a racial statement and then slides the elucidation of meaning of their utterance between 
expressing a majority generic claim or characteristic generic claim in a way that appears to agree with their 
interlocutor L. However, the speaker still maintains the implication of their racial generic assertion engaging 
in bad faith argumentation. The resultant loop is not unlike a parallel circuit in both redundancy and 
resistance to resistance. 
 
MÛC 
S: ‘Gs are fs.’ (ambiguous generic) 
L: ‘Not all Gs are fs. Gy and Gx are ¬fs.’ 
S: ‘Okay, but Gs tend to be fs.’ (Characteristic claim) 
L: ‘Gs have no affinity towards being fs greater than any ¬Gs have towards being fs.’ 
S: ‘Okay, but most Gs are fs.’ (Majority claim) 
…ad absurdum 
There are at least two salient components to this interaction. One that the form of the statement 
‘Gs are fs’ is shared by the characteristic generic and majority generic form. Another is how S’s statement is 
received by L which facilitates S’s utterance being accepted or denied to the common ground of discourse. 
Experimental research by Leslie and Gelman (2012), concludes that quantified statements like ‘some/most 
Gs are fs’ are remembered as generic assertions like ‘Gs are fs’.12 13This accounts for the over-attribution 
from striking property generic expressions to characteristic generic expressions. Because striking property 
generic claims and characteristic generic claims have the same form, the associations between them become 
entangled. While this may appear an efficient shortcut, it is one with fallacious and damaging results. 
Experimental evidence from Haslam et al. has concluded that “Members of highly essentialized social 
groups are more likely to have diminished social status and be subjected to prejudice” (2000) (Wodak; 
Leslie; Rhodes, 2015). This is only one of the many damaging effects of the over-attribution of essential 
properties to kinds.  
 
 
 
12 Leslie, S.-J., & Gelman, S. A. (2012). Quantified statements are recalled as generics: Evidence from preschool 
children and adults 
13 Cimpian, A., Brandone, A. C., & Gelman, S. A. (2010). Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but 
have powerful implications.  
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How do we come to believe essentialist ideas? Wodak and Leslie (2017) claim it originates with our 
the nature of them. ‘They’ are an exception to us and they are distinct in virtue of a relation (or lack thereof) 
to a property f. In Wodak and Leslie’s words, “[T]he use of generics about us communicates that we are an 
essentialized kind… and that we ought to instantiate the ideals of our kind (exposing individuals to a further 
pressure to conform to harmful stereotypes).”14 In a way, generics used to describe social kinds are not 
unlike slurs. 
Rebecca Kukla’s interpretation of slurring terms positions slurs as interpellations or hails.15 
Following Louis Althusser, interpellation involves a signifier recognize itself in its target, constitute its 
subjectivity, demand the target to recognize this recognition and for the target to regard themselves subject 
to the constitutive ideology cued by the signifier.16 Similar to slurs, generic terms essentialize contingent 
relations as the ‘raw material’ or natural kinds of a given ideology to greatly persistent and damaging effect.  
Racial fungibility is a reflection of the pernicious use of generics that tokenize and interpellate 
another person. Since slurs function as hails and racial generics are like slurs, racial generics likewise have 
associated signals that communicate the rule through the exception. To use a racial generic is to assume the 
kind and features that it employs. A racial generic when wielded by a bigoted speaker or an ignorant 
speaker is speaking from a place of exception; ‘though the ‘common man’ cannot speak this way, I can as a 
wielder of hegemonic power’. Indeed, a generic is less a weapon and more a schematic for destruction. In 
other words, generics encode their own destructive and reproductive meaning along lines of a discourse of 
power. 
It seems paradoxical to talk about us in terms of not-them and vice-versa, but it follows the logic of 
the wide exception-tolerance feature exemplary of generics. The status and relation to exceptions will be 
covered in a later paper. For now, we shall continue to the serial structure of the key schema 
 
In the following example QÞSP, S’s preconfigured essentialized generic beliefs about a G (‘Gs are 
fs’) encounter a member of the group G with a striking property f that is distinct from the other features of 
G and marks G for having this feature in virtue of f reliably predicting G’s group membership AND S 
having the belief that ‘Gs are fs.’ In other words, what makes a striking property striking is the features 
relation to the set of prior background beliefs of S concerning features of G. 
 
QÞSP 
S: ‘Gs are fs.’  
 
L: ‘That is false. Many Gs are not fs and some ¬Gs are fs.’ 
 
S: ‘Okay, but Gs are fs in a distinct, dangerous way unlike the way ¬Gs are fs.’ 
 
There are two faulty assumptions present: one is that there is a descriptive kind that is substantiated 
by any member to that the label is applied and the other is that there is a property that marks that kind as 
such. The essentializing assumption assisted by the ease of sliding reference from a belief about a singular G 
to the observation of a property f in tandem with those beliefs that either fit with the prior beliefs or defy 
preset expectation. 
This slip is where pernicious effects begin to accumulate; a kind is picked out via some assemblage 
of descriptors taken by S to be essential features f that signal G. The feature is elevated to a striking property 
and the “essentialized, unusual, aberrant actions on behalf of the few may be taken to characterize the group 
 
14 Wodak, D., & Leslie, S-J., (2017), p. 285. 
15 Kukla, R. (2018), p. 13. 
16 Althusser, L. (1970), p. 40. “As a first formulation I shall say: all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as 
concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject.” 
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as a whole” (Wodak and Leslie, 2017, p. 285). Generic terms like these are “sticky” in that the meanings 
associated with their use are easy to take up by listeners though difficult to refute.17  
An example BASEBALL makes the phenomenon of over-attribution clear. A common situation 
for children is to be in the ‘wrong place at the wrong time.’ Setting the stage for BASEBALL, two children 
Yef and Psam are practicing their knuckleball back and forth in the alley of a neighborhood. Another child 
Zho had just walked out to join them. In a dramatic windmill throw to impress Zho, Yef’s aim was no 
longer in the realm of the alley or reason and his pitch missed Psam exactly the distance that would place 
the ball in a nearby neighbor’s living room window. Nearby neighbor bursts from the front door in a frenzy, 
bellowing towards Yef, Psam and Zho, “You rambunctious kids broke my window!” All and each of the 
three children felt this hark was voiced towards themselves even if for three distinct reasons. Similarly, over-
attribution smears and confuses individual identities into a generic kind. 
Details to note: only Yef threw the ball and only one person could reasonably throw a ball. 
However, the nearby neighbor overattributed the responsibility for his broken window on all three children; 
Yef and Psam, even though Psam did not throw the ball, and Zho even though he was simply outside. It 
does not take much imagination to see how this scenario extends to the over-attribution of beliefs onto 
kinds instantiated by their sufficiently distinct features. 
 
Consider the following example SPÞC where S’s assertion of a striking property is met with 
resistance, causing S to slide his claim to that of a characteristic generic: 
 
SPÞC 
S: ‘Gs are fs’ (and this one is dangerous) 
 
L: ‘Not all Gs are fs.’ 
 
S: ‘Okay, but just enough Gs are fs and being an f is just dangerous enough to infer any G could be 
an f!’ 
 
Studies from Leslie and Gelman (2012) conclude the over-attribution of properties to novel kinds 
allows the slip from the implication of a striking property generic proposition to give rise to a characteristic 
generic proposition. As both striking property generics and characteristic generics resemble one another in 
form (‘Gs are fs’), what is allowed in conversation is whatever the interlocuter L does not deny. Over-
attribution of a striking property to a characteristic property is a primary process of how racial generics 
come to overattribute and entrench reductive propositions in Leslie’s psychological account.  
Another exchange between S and L may go like the example CÞN where a characteristic generic 
of the kind is elevated to a normative generic. 
CÞN 
S: ‘Gs are fs’ 
L: ‘No they aren’t, Gs are neither commonly f, strikingly f, nor characteristically f.’ 
S: ‘Okay, but Gs should be fs.’ 
Sally Haslanger in ‘The normal, the natural and the good: Generics and Ideology’, states “the idea 
of what’s normal may be statistical or normative: what tends to be or what ought to be” (2014: 22). CÞN is 
 
17 Anderson, L., Haslanger, S., & Langton, R., (2012), p. 20; Cimpian et al, (2010). 
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precisely representative of how perceived generic defaults become encoded as normative rules and social roles 
which are ascribed in the common ground of discourse at the scale of a society. 
The next slip from normative generic position to the reproduction and deposit of belief marks the 
end and the beginning of the series circuit of the key schema. Belief is either enacted, taught, or affirmed, 
but it cannot be denied. A feature of essentialist beliefs that lend to their durability is their productivity and 
ease of transmission . A experimental study by Rhodes, Leslie and Tworek (2012) concluded that hearing 
normative generic language about a social category precipitated essentialist beliefs about that social 
category.18 In other words, use of normative generics structure the belief patterns of members of a 
community of speakers. This causes the shift noted by the example NÞQ below: 
 
NÞQ 
S: ‘Gs are fs’ 
L: ‘Why are Gs fs?’ 
S: ‘Because Gs *are* fs.’ 
The marked equivalence expression in S’s response indicates an extralinguistic force beyond 
intonation reaffirming the normative category, castigating any G that does not perform the f role adequately 
as not representative of the kind. New language learners (like children) lack the language to take issue with 
affirming the norm, and instead integrate S’s statement ‘Gs are fs’ into the common ground of discourse 
and worse, integrate such assumptions about kinds defined by their essence. The norm of belief is the belief 
in the norm. 
Another tack the normative generic can take is reinforcing the speaker’s belief even if challenged. 
An interlocutor may challenge their assertion directly, but a speaker determined to maintain their 
commitments to the propositions of generics may claim ‘you may not agree but I believe some Gs are fs’. 
Such a claim produces a residue that may motivate others to ‘try on’ the claim because of the propensity for 
quantified generics to be recalled as generics as written about in Leslie and Gelman 2013 and elsewhere. 
How do norms influence beliefs? As mentioned before, normative beliefs function like rules in a 
game. Normative rules and social roles structure what moves are possible and consequently the beliefs 
about what move are possible. Beliefs take the form of descriptions that over time obtain explanatory 
power. Explanations themselves shift from a characteristic class of information to a normative class, reifying 
the descriptions so used as their own justification. 
Haslanger locates the locus of the problem in the entrenchment of “Essentialist and Normative 
Assumptions” in the common ground of discourse through stealthy accommodation of implications of 
essences and kinds.19 Leslie finds the problem in the usage of generics themselves. I claim that generics 
allow us to name the problem, so their usefulness cannot be discounted. Further, repressing their use will 
only reinforce the libidinal forces that maintain the logic of racial generics in motion. However, the profuse 
number of essentializing assumptions remain lodged within social consciousness must be excised. I propose 
a solution for unlocking our bound rationality through an understanding of the key schema. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Rhodes, M., Leslie, S.-J., & Tworek, C. M. (2012). Cultural transmission of social essentialism. 
19 Haslanger, S. (2014), p. 17.  
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The Key Schema 
 
Putting our examples of QÞSP, SPÞC, CÞN, NÞQ, and MÛC together, we have a structure of 
slips henceforth named the key schema shown in Fig. 1. The key schema is a model of the circuitry of 
argument along which racial generic discourse follows composed of the following elements:	M	is the 
majority claim; C	is the characteristic claim; N	is the normative claim; Q	is the notion of belief in a claim; 
and SP	is the striking property. An agents subjective position is propelled along these slips, stopping only 
long enough to shake out undesirable exceptions that threaten their generic classifications. 
 
																	𝑵	
												↗							↘ 
𝑴↔ 𝑪													𝑸 
											↖									↙ 
											𝑺𝑷 
𝐹𝑖𝑔. 1 
 
A feature of this structure is the social “looping” effects (Haslanger 2014). In her own words, 
“[W]hat’s statistically normal is taken to be evidence of how things are by nature,” and hence an inevitability 
to be accommodated; and how things are by nature is taken to be how things “ought to be,” and thereby 
legitimated and socially enforced (Haslanger 2014: 22). In other words, the previously mentioned 
essentializing and normative effects edify and reproduce themselves, reified into sociocultural ideals backed 
by institutional structures that reproduce conformity and repress difference, or in Althusser’s language, 
ideological and repressive state apparatuses.20 An interlocutor anticipating and responding to the cognitive 
slips of a speaker resituates the subject with respect to their assumptions and implications of their speech 
and their position within the generic belief generation pathway. As active agents in the world equipped with 
words that can change the world, we are compelled to strategically dismantle the lazy generalizations that 
permit the continued epistemic injustice perpetuated and legitimized by the pernicious use of social kind 
generics. 
This minimal model relies upon a speaker’s assertions to implicate their position along the path 
based on how their claim is received and the speakers subsequent denial of their interlocutors assumption 
abouttheir utterance. If their utterance of a racial generic is accepted by the normative standards of the 
community of speakers, the racial generic is brought into being as a kind that someone in the community 
believes and up to others to deny, confirm, or reject. 
 
Explication of the Key Schema 
 
It is clear the theory is dependent upon the interaction between the reception of an utterance and 
its ambiguity admitting the form of the utterance that allows discourse to continue uninterrupted. How 
words are used depends on how they are received by the speaker. For this reason, I shall analyze both the 
assertion and the interpretation of its associated slippery implication.  
 
 
 
20 Althusser, L. (1970) p. 2. “It follows that, in order to exist, every social formation must reproduce the conditions of 
its production at the same time as it produces, and in order to be able to produce. It must therefore reproduce: 1. the 
productive forces, 2. the existing relations of production.” 
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Consider the following statements, where ‘X’ is a derogatory generic term used to refer to a group 
targeted in virtue of their group membership; the asterisk [*] marking an inflationary force: 
 
[A] X is deserving of contempt. 
[B] X’s are deserving of contempt. 
[B*] X’s *are deserving* of contempt. 
[C] Most X’s are deserving of contempt. 
[C*] ALL X’s are deserving of contempt. 
 
Q	or the notion of belief is the assertion of [A] and the implication of [B] 
SP	or the striking property claim is the assertion of [B] and the implication of [A] 
C	or the characteristic claim is the assertion of [B] and the implication of [C*] 
M	or the majority claim is the assertion [C] and the implication of [B] 
N	or the normative claim is the assertion of [B] and the implication of [B*] 
 
Mapping these equivalencies on the key schema, we arrive at Fig. 2.  
 
																	
𝑩
𝑩∗
	
												↗							↘ 
𝑪
𝑩
↔
𝑩
𝑪∗
													
𝑨
𝑩
 
											↖									↙ 
											
𝑩
𝑨
 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑔. 2 
  
Analysis of Fig. 2 
 
While one may enter the circuit of racial generic discourse at any gate, I will begin with the 
appearance of the notion of belief, which is inherited from the social environment. As mentioned before by 
Cimpian et al. (2010) and Leslie and Gelman (2012), pre-existing normative claims produce a set of beliefs 
containing an assertion about an individual G and tacitly imply a claim about the class of Gs in virtue of 
being picked out by that kind. The striking property position is the inverse of the notion of belief which 
lends to its prima facia un-believability that structures the saliency of the striking property. From here, we 
see the characteristic position inflates the implication of the striking property to the position of a universal 
while maintaining the surface assertion. The contingency of the characteristic position is signified by the 
possibility of a move to a majority position or a move to the normative position. The majority-characteristic 
position operates like a parallel circuit, recharging assumptions that are weakened by changing norms. Once 
a sufficient threshold of difference is surpassed, the circuit continuous along the serial path to the normative 
position. The normative states the generic belief but with power. The electrical and libidinal metaphor is no 
accident. Power, following the path of least resistance, completes the circuit by producing a set of beliefs. 
The set of beliefs reach the disempowered first via force or the threat of force sustained by the belief of the 
singular ‘G is an f’, which is reinforced and legitimized by the underlying normative presupposition 
enactment of the proposition that ‘Gs are fs’. Thus, the cycle continues limited only by relative difference in 
belief in the assertions and implications of the agent following the path of the key schema. 
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Objections and Future Direction 
 
One problem for the key schema is the SPÞC slip or the problem of over-extension. A study by 
Lazaridou-Chatzigoga, Katsos and Stockall (2019) found that children and adults were less likely to extend 
striking property generics to novel instances of the kind. However, the experiment may have revealed another 
element for further inquiry. Noted in their ‘General Discussion’ was the fact that their experimental method 
involved images for representing the striking properties of fictional kinds while previous studies were 
conducted via text with participants reading sentences.21 I purport that representation plays a major role in the 
explanation of the apparent reversal Lazaridou-Chatzigoga et al. (2019) observed of the trend first seen by 
Cimpian et al (2010) and others. Representation of social kinds and their internal exceptions may interrupt 
the encoding of fungibility into racial generics. 
Another problem for the key schema is the QÞSP slip or the casual bigot problem. A speaker’s beliefs 
may not necessarily judge a feature to the level of saliency required to be striking. For example, S may assert 
‘Gs are hs’, but if Gs could be an f and S believes Gs could be an f but isn’t an f now, then the belief may fail to 
escalate to a striking property. 
A synthesis of the contrary findings of Lazadirou-Chatzigoga et al. (2019) and Cimpian et al (2012) 
invites at least two questions22: 
 
1. What is the effect of representation of difference prior to exposure to generics on forming beliefs 
about extensions of striking properties? 
2. What is the effect of the degree of explicit mention of ‘danger’ to make striking properties salient?  
 
Representation of a distinct property that could interrupt the uptake of generics and the extent of a 
generic term’s saliency remain at the center of the discussion. Discourse centered on participants asserting 
their explicit beliefs lowers the threshold of difference between assertions and implications and normative 
gnerics are less likely to take hold. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I have outlined the five points of intersection between classes of generics that form an overall 
structure of generic belief generation in a model I call the key schema. I have given a cursory treatment to 
the associated assertions and implications that compose each class of generic. I have mentioned two 
objections to the key schema, the problem of over-extension and the problem of the casual bigot. I 
conclude that the notion of representation can work to interrupt the narrative maintained by racial generics 
and the associated normative institutions that undergird their use as such. An interlocutor who anticipates 
and responding to the cognitive slips of a speaker resituates the subject with respect to their assumptions 
and implications of their speech and their position within the generic belief generation pathway. While 
more work is to be done tracking the possible effects of representation of novel kinds on the uptake of 
generics, I think the key schema is a valuable development in tracking a speaker’s belief set movement 
through stages of discourse that share form with social kind generics embedded in their assertions and 
presuppositions.  Discourse centered on participants asserting their beliefs lowers the threshold of 
difference between assertions and implications may open a door to a world with fewer generics by meeting 
the users of racial generics where they are.  
 
21 Lazaridou-Chatzigoga, D., Katsos, N., & Stockall, L. (2019). Generalizing about striking properties: Do glippets love 
to play with fire? 
22 Lazadirou-Chatzigoga et al. (2019) aso mentions regarding representation, “Other directions for future research 
would be to establish whether property extension was influenced not only by what evidence was presented to the 
children, but also by how evidence was presented” (12) 
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